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POSITION-BASED QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY:
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Abstract. In this work, we study position-based cryptography in the quantum setting. The
aim is to use the geographical position of a party as its only credential. On the negative side, we
show that if adversaries are allowed to share an arbitrarily large entangled quantum state, the task
of secure position-verification is impossible. To this end, we prove the following very general result.
Assume that Alice and Bob hold respectively subsystems A and B of a (possibly) unknown quantum
state |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB. Their goal is to calculate and share a new state |ϕ〉 = U |ψ〉, where U is a
fixed unitary operation. The question that we ask is how many rounds of mutual communication
are needed. It is easy to achieve such a task using two rounds of classical communication, whereas,
in general, it is impossible with no communication at all. Surprisingly, in case Alice and Bob share
enough entanglement to start with and we allow an arbitrarily small failure probability, we show that
the same task can be done using a single round of classical communication in which Alice and Bob
exchange two classical messages. Actually, we prove that a relaxed version of the task can be done
with no communication at all, where the task is to compute instead a state |ϕ′〉 that coincides with
|ϕ〉 = U |ψ〉 up to local operations on A and on B, which are determined by classical information
held by Alice and Bob. The one-round scheme for the original task then follows as a simple corollary.
We also show that these results generalize to more players. As a consequence, we show a generic
attack that breaks any position-verification scheme. On the positive side, we show that if adversaries
do not share any entangled quantum state but can compute arbitrary quantum operations, secure
position-verification is achievable. Jointly, these results suggest the interesting question whether
secure position-verification is possible in case of a bounded amount of entanglement. Our positive
result can be interpreted as resolving this question in the simplest case, where the bound is set
to zero. In models where secure position-verification is achievable, it has a number of interesting
applications. For example, it enables secure communication over an insecure channel without having
any preshared key, with the guarantee that only a party at a specific location can learn the content
of the conversation. More generally, we show that in settings where secure position-verification is
achievable, other position-based cryptographic schemes are possible as well, such as secure position-
based authentication and position-based key agreement.
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1. Introduction.
1.1. Background. The goal of position-based cryptography is to use the geo-
graphical position of a party as its only “credential.” For example, one would like to
send a message to a party at a geographical position pos with the guarantee that the
party can decrypt the message only if he or she is physically present at pos. Such a
setting has plenty of real-life applications for wireless security, for instance, granting
access to resources only when a user is present at a certain perimeter (e.g., inside a
bank branch, or inside a military base). The general concept of position-based cryp-
tography was introduced by Chandran et al. [16]; certain specific related tasks have
been considered before under different names (see below and section 1.3).
A central task in position-based cryptography is the problem of position-veri-
fication. We have a prover P at position pos wishing to convince a set of verifi-
ers V0, . . . , Vk (at different points in geographical space) that P is indeed at that
position pos. The prover can run an interactive protocol with the verifiers in order to
convince them. The main technique for such a protocol is known as distance bounding
[9]. In this technique, a verifier sends a random nonce to P and measures the time
taken for P to reply back with this value. Assuming that the speed of communication
is bounded by the speed of light, this technique gives an upper bound on the distance
of P from the verifier.
The problem of secure position-verification has been studied before in the field of
wireless security, and there have been several proposals for this task [9, 43, 12, 14, 45,
49, 13, 48]. However, Chandran et al. [16] show that there exists no protocol for secure
position-verification that offers security in the presence of multiple colluding adver-
saries. In other words, the set of verifiers cannot distinguish between the case when
they are interacting with an honest prover at pos and the case when they are interact-
ing with multiple colluding dishonest provers, none of which is at position pos. Their
impossibility result holds even if one makes computational hardness assumptions, and
it also rules out most other interesting position-based cryptographic tasks.
In light of the strong impossibility result, Chandran et al. [16] consider a setting
that assumes restrictions on the parties’ storage capabilities, called the bounded-
retrieval model (BRM) in the full version of [16], and construct secure protocols
for position-verification and for position-based key exchange (wherein the verifiers, in
addition to verifying the position claim of a prover, also exchange a secret key with the
prover). While these protocols give us a way to realize position-based cryptography,
the underlying setting is relatively hard to justify in practice.
This leaves us with the following question: Are there any other assumptions or
settings in which position-based cryptography is realizable?
1.2. Our approach and our results. In this work, we study position-based
cryptography in the quantum setting. To start with, let us briefly explain why moving
to the quantum setting might be useful. The impossibility result of [16] relies heavily
on the fact that an adversary can locally store all information she receives and at the
same time share this information with other colluding adversaries, located elsewhere.
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Recall that the positive result of [16] in the BRM circumvents the impossibility result
by assuming that an adversary cannot store all information he receives. By considering
the quantum setting, one may be able to circumvent the impossibility result thanks
to the following observation. If some information is encoded into a quantum state,
then the above attack fails due to the no-cloning principle: the adversary can either
store the quantum state or send it to a colluding adversary (or do something in
between, like store part of it) but not both.
However, this intuition turns out to be not completely accurate. Once the ad-
versaries preshare entangled states, they can make use of quantum teleportation [6].
Although teleportation on its own does not appear to immediately conflict with the
above intuition, we show that, based on techniques by Vaidman [47], adversaries hold-
ing a large number of entangled quantum states can perform instantaneous nonlocal
quantum computation, which in particular implies that they can perform any unitary
operation on a state shared between them, using only local operations and one round
of classical communication (where both can send messages). Based on this technique,
we show how a coalition of adversaries can attack and break any position-verification
scheme.
Interestingly, sharing entangled quantum systems is vital for attacking the po-
sition-verification scheme. We show that there exist schemes that are secure in the
information-theoretic sense if the adversary is not allowed to preshare or maintain
entanglement. Furthermore, we show how to construct secure protocols for several
position-based cryptographic tasks: position-verification, authentication, and key ex-
change.
This leads to an interesting open question regarding the amount of preshared
entanglement required to break the position-verification scheme: the case of a large
number of preshared states yields a complete break of any scheme, while having no
preshared states leads to information-theoretically secure schemes. The exact number
of preshared quantum systems that keeps the system secure is yet unknown.
1.3. Related work. To the best of our knowledge, quantum schemes for position-
verification were first considered by Kent in 2002 under the name of “quantum tag-
ging.” Together with Munro, Spiller, and Beausoleil, a patent for an (insecure) scheme
was filed for HP Labs in 2004 and granted in 2006 [32]. Their results did not appear
in the academic literature until 2010 [30, 31]. In that paper, they describe several ba-
sic schemes and describe how to break them using teleportation-based attacks. They
propose other variations (Schemes IV–VI in [31]) which are not broken by their tele-
portation attack and leave their security as an open question. Our general attack
shows that these schemes are insecure as well.
Concurrent and independent of our work and the work on quantum tagging de-
scribed above, the approach of using quantum techniques for secure position-verifi-
cation was proposed by Malaney [36, 37]. However, the proposed scheme is merely
claimed secure, and no rigorous security analysis is provided. As pointed out in [31],
Malaney’s schemes can also be broken by a teleportation-based attack.
In a preliminary version of this paper [15] (by a subset of the current authors), a
secure quantum scheme for position-verification was proposed. However, that proof
implicitly assumed that the adversaries have no preshared entanglement; as shown by
[31], that scheme also becomes insecure without such an assumption.
In a subsequent paper [34], Lau and Lo use ideas similar to those in [31] to
show the insecurity of position-verification schemes that are of a certain (yet rather
restricted) form, which include the schemes from [36, 37] and [15]. Furthermore, they
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propose a modified position-verification scheme that resists their attack. This scheme
is shown to be secure against a restricted adversary that shares at most two qubits
and, in an earlier version of their paper [33] (published before our impossibility result),
is conjectured to be secure also against an unrestricted adversary.
In a recent note Kent [28] considers a different model for position-based cryp-
tography where the prover’s position is not his only credential, but he is assumed to
additionally share with the verifiers a classical key unknown to the adversary. In this
case, quantum key distribution (QKD) can be used to expand that key ad infinitum.
This classical key stream is then used as an authentication resource.
The idea of performing “instantaneous measurements of nonlocal variables”
was initiated by Aharonov and Albert [1, 2], who showed how to measure certain
nonlocal properties (namely, the Bell operator). Vaidman [47] provided a scheme
that is capable of performing any nonlocal measurement (with overwhelming success
probability, which depends on the amount of preshared entanglement). Clark et al.
[19] further improved Vaidman’s scheme and obtained a scheme that guarantees suc-
cess while using a finite amount of preshared entanglement. The concept of instan-
taneous nonlocal quantum computation presented here is an extension of Vaidman’s
task.
The appearance and circulation of our work has triggered a number of follow-
up results. Beigi and Ko¨nig [3] used the technique of port-based teleportation by
Ishizaka and Hiroshima [25, 26] to reduce the amount of entanglement required to
perform instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation (from our doubly exponen-
tial) to exponential in size of the quantum system (i.e., the number of qubits being
measured).
In [3], it is also shown that any one-round position-verification scheme that is
secure with a sufficiently small error probability against an adversary with no pre-
shared entanglement is automatically also secure (with a larger error probability,
though) against an adversary with some limited amount of entanglement. Unfor-
tunately, this result is not applicable to our positive results since our schemes are
multiround schemes. However, it shows that analyzing schemes against an adver-
sary with no entanglement is a good starting point to obtaining security against a
limited amount of entanglement. In fact, this path was taken by Tomamichel et al.
[46], where a parallel-repetition result for a so-called monogamy game is proven and
used to obtain a one-round position-verification scheme, with a sufficiently small error
probability so that it gives rise to a scheme that is secure against an adversary with
a limited amount of entanglement.
In [11], Buhrman et al. suggest that a certain class of attacks on a particularly
simple protocol for position-verification can be analyzed by using techniques from
communication complexity. Motivated by this observation, they introduce the new
notion of garden-hose (communication) complexity of a function which turns out to
be connected to the number of Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) pairs required to
(perfectly) attack this class of position-verification protocols.
Kent proposes a general framework for quantum tasks in Minkowski space [29].
Position-based cryptographic tasks can be seen as special cases of such a general
framework.
Giovannetti, Lloyd, and Maccone [23] show how to measure the distance between
two parties by quantum cryptographic means so that only trusted people have access
to the result. This is a different kind of problem than what we consider, and the
techniques used there are not applicable in our setting.
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1.4. Our attack and our schemes in more detail.
Position verification—a simple approach. Let us briefly discuss the 1-dimensional
case in which we have two verifiers, V0 and V1, and a prover, P , at position pos that
lies on the straight line between V0 and V1. Roughly speaking, to verify P ’s position,
V0 sends a BB84 qubit H
θ|x〉 to P , where x ∈ {0, 1} and H is the Hadamard matrix;
simultaneously, V1 sends the corresponding basis θ ∈ {0, 1} to P . The sending of
these messages is timed in such a way that Hθ|x〉 and θ arrive at position pos at the
same time. P has to measure the qubit in basis θ to obtain x and immediately send x
to both V0 and V1, who verify the correctness of x and if it has arrived “in time.” See
section 6 for a formal definition of the above scheme and its full analysis.
The intuition for this scheme is the following. Consider a dishonest prover Pˆ0
between V0 and P and a dishonest prover Pˆ1 between V1 and P . (It is not too hard
to see that additional dishonest provers do not help.) When Pˆ0 receives the BB84
qubit, she does not know the corresponding basis θ yet. Thus, if she measures it
immediately when she receives it, she is likely to measure it in the wrong basis, and
Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 will not be able to provide the correct x. However, if she waits until she
knows the basis θ, Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 will be too late in sending x to V1 in time. Similarly,
if she forwards the BB84 qubit to Pˆ1, who receives θ before Pˆ0 does, then Pˆ0 and Pˆ1
will be too late in sending x to V0. It seems that in order to break the scheme, Pˆ0
needs to store the qubit until she receives the basis θ and at the same time send a
copy of it to Pˆ1. But such actions are excluded by the no-cloning principle.
The attack and instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation. The above intuition
turns out to be wrong. Using preshared entanglement yet no communication, Pˆ0 and
Pˆ1 can in fact jointly perform a measurement of |ψ〉 = Hθ|x〉 in basis θ when one of
them holds |ψ〉 and the other holds θ, and the outcome will be classically distributed
between them (that is, the measurement outcome, obtained by one party, is correct
up to some Pauli-corrections, known by the other party). Combining this fact with
the observation by Kent, Munro, and Spiller [31] that the Pauli-corrections resulting
from the teleportation commute with the actions of the honest prover in the above
protocol shows that colluding adversaries can perfectly break the protocol.
Much more generally, we will show how to break any position-verification scheme,
possibly consisting of multiple (and interleaved) rounds. To this end, we will show
how to perform instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation.1 That is, we prove that
any unitary operation U acting on a composite system shared between players can be
performed using only a single round of mutual classical communication. We obtain our
computation scheme by using ideas by Vaidman [47]. Informally speaking, the players
“teleport” quantum states back and forth many times in a clever way, without awaiting
the classical measurement outcomes from the other party’s teleportations. After each
such “teleportation,” the state on the receiving end has a constant probability of
being identical to the original state, or otherwise it is the same up to some (tensor
product of) Pauli-corrections; furthermore, the sender knows whether or not Pauli-
corrections are needed. The receiving side performs U on the joint state, assuming no
Pauli-corrections are needed, and “teleports” the result back to sender. In the case
that no Pauli-corrections are needed, the computation ends. Otherwise, the scheme
is repeated; however, since now the parties hold an altered version of the input state,
1Although in physics it is common to say that an operator U acts on a system |ψ〉, we adopt a
more computer-science oriented terminology and use the word “computation” to indicate the joint
execution of a unitary U on |ψ〉. The output of this distributed computation is the state |ϕ〉 = U |ψ〉,
possibly distributed between the parties.
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the unitary U ′ to be computed this time should first undo the computation of the
first round and only then perform U . See full details in section 4.
Position verification in the no-preshared entanglement (No-PE) model. On the
other hand, the above intuition about the security of the protocol is correct in the no-
preshared entanglement (No-PE) model, where the adversaries are not allowed to have
preshared entangled quantum states prior to the execution of the protocol, or, more
generally, prior to the execution of each round of the protocol in case of multiround
schemes. Even though this model may be somewhat unrealistic and artificial, ana-
lyzing protocols in this setting serves as stepping stone to obtaining protocols which
tolerate adversaries who preshare and maintain some limited amount of entanglement
[46]. But also, rigorously proving security in the restrictive (for the adversary) No-PE
model is already nontrivial and requires heavy machinery. Our proof uses the strong
complementary information trade-off (CIT) due to Renes and Boileau [40], and it
guarantees that for any strategy against the simple scheme outlined above, the suc-
cess probability of Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 is bounded by approximately 0.89. By repeating the
above simple scheme sequentially, we get a secure multiround position-verification
scheme with exponentially small soundness error. We note that when performing se-
quential repetitions in the No-PE model, the adversaries must enter each round with
no entanglement; thus, they are not allowed to generate entanglement in one round,
store it, and use it in the next round(s).
Position-based authentication and key-exchange in the No-PE model. In the task
of position-based authentication, the prover P sends a message m to the verifiers.
The requirement is that the verifiers acknowledge m as “authenticated” only if its
originator P is located at pos; see formal definition in section 7. Our position-based
authentication scheme is based on our position-verification scheme. The idea is to
start with a “weak” authentication scheme for a 1-bit message m: the verifiers and P
execute the secure position-verification scheme; if P wishes to authenticate m = 1,
then P correctly finishes the scheme by sending x back, but if P wishes to authenticate
m = 0, P sends back an “erasure” symbol ⊥ instead of the correct reply x with some
probability q (which needs to be carefully chosen). This authentication scheme is
weak in the sense that turning 1 into 0 is easy for the adversary, but turning a 0 into
a 1 fails with constant probability.
The scheme is now augmented by performing multiple sequential repetitions of
the weak authentication scheme. Based on ideas from [42, 27, 17], we use a suitable
balanced encoding of the actual message to be authenticated, so that for any two
messages, the adversary needs to turn many 0’s into 1’s. Unfortunately, an arbitrary
balanced encoding is not good enough. The reason is that we do not assume the
verifiers and the honest P to be synchronized. This asynchrony allows the adversary
to use an (out of sync) honest P in order to authenticate a different message. Never-
theless, we show that the above approach does work for carefully chosen codes. We
show that, for instance, the bitwise encoding which maps 0 into 00 . . . 0 11 . . .1 and
1 into 11 . . .1 00 . . .0 is such a code.
Given a position-based authentication scheme, one can immediately obtain a
position-based key exchange scheme simply by (essentially) executing an arbitrary
QKD scheme (e.g., [5]), which assumes an authenticated classical communication
channel, and authenticate the classical communication by means of the position-based
authentication scheme.
1.5. Organization of the paper. In section 2, we begin by introducing no-
tation and presenting the relevant background from quantum information theory.
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In section 3, we describe the problem of position-verification and define our standard
quantum model as well as the No-PE model in more detail. A protocol for computing
any unitary operation using local operations and one round of classical communica-
tion is provided and analyzed in section 4, and in section 5 we conclude that there
does not exist any protocol for position-verification (and hence for position-based
authentication or key exchange) in the standard quantum model. We present our
position-verification protocol in the No-PE model in section 6. Section 7 is devoted
to our position-based authentication protocol and showing how to combine the above
tools to obtain position-based key exchange.
2. Preliminaries.
2.1. Notation and terminology. We assume the reader to be familiar with
the basic concepts of quantum information theory and refer the reader to [39] for an
excellent introduction; we merely fix some notation.
Qubits. A qubit is a quantum system A with a 2-dimensional state spaceHA = C2.
The computational basis {|0〉, |1〉} (for a qubit) is given by |0〉 = (10) and |1〉 =(
0
1
)
, and the Hadamard basis by H {|0〉, |1〉} = {H |0〉, H |1〉}, where H denotes the
2-dimensional Hadamard matrix, which maps |0〉 to (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2 and |1〉 to (|0〉 −
|1〉)/√2. The state space of an n-qubit system A = A1 · · ·An is given by the
2n-dimensional space HA = (C2)⊗n = C2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ C2.
Since we mainly use the above two bases, we can simplify terminology and
notation by identifying the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉} with the bit 0 and the
Hadamard basis H {|0〉, |1〉} with the bit 1. Hence, when we say that an n-qubit
state |ψ〉 ∈ (C2)⊗n is measured in basis θ ∈ {0, 1}n, we mean that the state is mea-
sured qubitwise where basis Hθi {|0〉, |1〉} is used for the ith qubit. As a result of the
measurement, the string x ∈ {0, 1}n is observed with probability |〈ψ|Hθ|x〉|2, where
Hθ = Hθ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Hθn and |x〉 = |x1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉.
An important example of a 2-qubit state is the EPR pair, which is given by
|ΦAB〉 = (|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉)/
√
2 ∈ HA⊗HB = C2⊗C2 and has the following properties:
if qubit A is measured in the computational basis, a uniformly random bit x ∈ {0, 1}
is observed, and qubit B collapses to |x〉. Similarly, if qubit A is measured in the
Hadamard basis, a uniformly random bit x ∈ {0, 1} is observed, and qubit B collapses
to H |x〉.
Density matrices and trace distance. For any complex Hilbert space H, we write
D(H) for the set of all density matrices acting on H. We measure closeness of two
density matrices ρ and σ in D(H) by their trace distance: δ(ρ, σ) := 12 tr|ρ − σ|.
One can show that for any physical processing of two quantum states described by
ρ and σ, respectively, the two states behave in an indistinguishable way except with
probability at most δ(ρ, σ). Thus, informally, if δ(ρ, σ) is very small, then without
making a significant error, the two quantum states can be considered equal.
Classical and hybrid systems (and states). Subsystem X of a bipartite quantum
systemXE is called classical if the state ofXE is given by a density matrix of the form
ρXE =
∑
x∈X PX(x)|x〉〈x|⊗ρxE , where X is a finite set of cardinality |X | = dim(HX),
PX : X → [0, 1] is a probability distribution, {|x〉}x∈X is some fixed orthonormal
basis of HX , and ρxE is a density matrix on HE for every x ∈ X . Such a state,
called the hybrid state (also known as the cq-state, for classical and quantum), can
equivalently be understood as consisting of a random variable X with distribution
PX and range X , and a system E that is in state ρxE exactly when X takes on the
value x. This formalism naturally extends to two (or more) classical systems X , Y ,
etc. as well as to two (or more) quantum systems.
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Teleportation. The goal of teleportation is to transfer a quantum state from one
location to another by only communicating classical information. Teleportation re-
quires preshared entanglement among the two locations. Specifically, to teleport a
qubit Q in an arbitrary (and typically unknown) state |ψ〉 from Alice to Bob, Alice
performs a Bell measurement on Q and her half of an EPR pair, yielding a classical
measurement outcome k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Instantaneously, the other half of the corre-
sponding EPR pair, which is held by Bob, turns into the state σ†k|ψ〉, where σ0 = I,
σ1, σ2, σ3 denote the four Pauli matrices, and σ
†
k denotes the complex conjugate of the
transpose of Pk. The classical information k is then communicated to Bob, who can
recover the state |ψ〉 by performing σk on his EPR half. Note that the operator σk is
Hermitian and unitary; thus σ†k = σk and σkσ
†
k = I.
2.2. Some quantum information theory. The von Neumann entropy of a
quantum state ρ ∈ D(H) is given by H(ρ) := −tr(ρ log(ρ)), where here and throughout
the article, log denotes the binary logarithm. H(ρ) is nonnegative and upper bounded
by log(dim(H)). For a bipartite quantum state ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗HB), the conditional
von Neumann entropy of A given B is defined as H(ρAB|B) := H(ρAB) − H(ρB). In
cases where the state ρAB is clear from the context, we may write H(A|B) instead
of H(ρAB|B). If X and Y are both classical, H(X |Y ) coincides with the classical
conditional Shannon entropy. Furthermore, in case of conditioning (partly) on a
classical state, the following holds.
Lemma 2.1. For any tripartite state ρABY with classical Y ,
H(A|BY ) =
∑
y
PY (y)H(ρ
y
AB |B).
Lemma 2.1 along with the concavity of H and Jensen’s inequality implies that for
classical Y , H(A) ≥ H(A|Y ) ≥ 0. The proof of Lemma 2.1 is given in Appendix A.
The following theorem is a generalization of the well-known Holevo bound [24]
(see also [39]) and follows from the monotonicity of mutual information. Informally,
it says that measuring only reduces your information. Formally, and tailored to the
notation used here, it ensures the following.
Theorem 2.2. Let ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB) be an arbitrary bipartite state, and
let ρAY be obtained by measuring B in some basis to observe (classical) Y . Then
H(A|Y ) ≥ H(A|B).
For classical X and Y , the Fano inequality [22] (see also [20]) allows us to bound
the probability of correctly guessing X when having access to Y . In the statement
below and throughout the paper, h : [0, 1] → [0, 1] denotes the binary entropy function
defined as h(p) = −p log(p)− (1−p) log(1−p) for 0 < p < 1 and as h(p) = 0 for p = 0
or 1, and h−1 : [0, 1] → [0, 12 ] denotes its inverse on the branch 0 ≤ p ≤ 12 .
Theorem 2.3 (Fano inequality). Let X and Y be random variables with ranges
X and Y, respectively, and let Xˆ be a guess for X computed solely from Y . Then
q := P [Xˆ =X ] satisfies
h(q) + q log(|X | − 1) ≥ H(X |Y ).
In particular, for binary X, q ≥ h−1(H(X |Y )).
2.3. Strong complementary information trade-off. At the heart of our se-
curity proofs is the following entropic uncertainty principle due to [40], called strong
complementary information trade-off (CIT), and which was later generalized by [7]
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to bases other than computational and Hadamard bases. Loosely speaking, it re-
lates the uncertainty of the measurement outcome of a system A using some basis θ
with the uncertainty of the measurement outcome when the complementary basis θ¯ is
used instead, and it guarantees that no two systems E and F coexist such that E has
full information on the outcome in basis θ and F has full information on the outcome in
basis θ¯. Note that by the complementary basis θ¯ of a basis θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ {0, 1}n,
we mean the n-bit string θ¯ = (θ¯1, . . . , θ¯n) ∈ {0, 1}n with θ¯i = θi for all i.
Theorem 2.4 (CIT). Let |ψAEF 〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HE ⊗ HF be an arbitrary tripartite
state where HA = (C2)⊗n. Let the hybrid state ρXEF be obtained by measuring A in
basis θ ∈ {0, 1}n, and let the hybrid state σXEF be obtained by measuring A (of the
original state |ψAEF 〉) in the complementary basis θ¯. Then
H(ρXE |E) + H(σXF |F ) ≥ n.
CIT in particular implies the following.
Corollary 2.5. Let |ψAEF 〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HE ⊗ HF be an arbitrary tripartite state
where HA = (C2)⊗n. Let Θ be uniformly distributed in {0, 1}n, and let X be the result
of measuring A in basis Θ. Then
H(X |ΘE) + H(X |ΘF ) ≥ n.
Note that by convexity of the entropy, the claims also hold for mixed states.
Proof. By Lemma 2.1, we can write
H(X |ΘE) + H(X |ΘF ) = 1
2n
∑
θ
H(ρθXE |E) +
1
2n
∑
θ
H(ρθXF |F )
=
1
2n
∑
θ
(
H(ρθXE |E) + H(ρθ¯XF |F )
)
.
Note that ρθXE is obtained by measuring A of |ψAEF 〉 in basis θ (and ignoring F ), and
ρθ¯XF is obtained by measuringA of |ψAEF 〉 in the complementary basis θ¯ (and ignoring
E). Hence, Theorem 2.4 applies, and we can conclude that H(ρθXE |E)+H(ρθ¯XF |F ) ≥ n
and thus H(X |ΘE) + H(X |ΘF ) ≥ n.
3. Position verification.
3.1. Setting, space and time, and communication model. We consider
entities V0, . . . , Vk, called verifiers, and an entity P , the (honest) prover. Additionally,
we consider a coalition Pˆ of dishonest provers (or adversaries) Pˆ0, . . . , Pˆ. All entities
are restricted by the laws of quantum mechanics; they can perform arbitrary quantum
(and classical) operations and can communicate quantum (and classical) messages
among them. We assume that quantum operations and communication are noise-free
and that local computations take no time.
Each entity is assigned an arbitrary fixed position pos in the d-dimensional spaceRd.
Throughout the paper, we require that the honest prover P is enclosed by the ver-
ifiers V0, . . . , Vk in that the prover’s position pos ∈ Rd lies within the polyhedron,
i.e., convex hull, Hull(pos0, . . . , posk) ⊂ Rd formed by the respective positions of the
verifiers.
We assume that messages to be communicated travel at fixed velocity v (e.g., with
the speed of light in a vacuum), and hence the time needed for a message to travel
from one entity to another equals the Euclidean distance between the two (assuming
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that v is normalized to 1). This timing assumption holds for honest and dishonest
entities.
We also assume that the verifiers have precise and synchronized clocks, so that
they can coordinate exact times for sending messages and can measure the exact time
of a message arrival. We do not require P ’s clock to be precise or in sync with the
verifiers. Actually, we will allow the adversary to fully control the frequency of P ’s
clock.
With the above model, we can reason as follows. Consider a verifier V0 at posi-
tion pos0 who sends a challenge ch0 to the (supposedly honest) prover claiming to be
at position pos. If V0 receives a reply within time 2d(pos0, pos), where d(·, ·) is the
Euclidean distance measure in Rd and thus also measures the time a message takes
from one point to the other, then V0 can conclude that he is communicating with a
prover that is within distance d(pos0, pos).
Remark. Our model above relies on several idealized assumptions—mainly, flat
space(time), fixed velocity of information travel, instantaneous local computations,
point-shaped locations, error-free quantum communication, and information process-
ing. This is necessary in order to obtain a clean model that is simple enough to
prove rigorous results. Relaxing these assumptions is beyond the scope of this work.
As such, our work should be appreciated from a theoretical perspective, as trying
to understand the possibilities and the limitations of the theory of quantum me-
chanics to position-based cryptography; we do not make any real-life practicality
claims.
We stress, however, that relaxing the assumptions (e.g., introducing noise) typi-
cally makes the life of the honest parties harder and simplifies the life of the dishonest
parties.2 As such, our negative result for position-verification does not strongly rely
on these assumptions and is likely to carry over also to more realistic settings. See
further discussion about relaxing the assumptions in section 8.
3.2. The security model. In this work we consider only stand-alone security;
i.e., we analyze only a single execution with a single honest prover, and we do not
guarantee any kind of composable or concurrent security. We note that an impossi-
bility result for stand-alone security implies impossibility in any composable setting;
on the other hand, our positive results are restricted to the stand-alone case. Fur-
thermore, we assume that P cannot be reset ; that is, the adversary cannot restart
P ’s program and make P run the protocol again from its starting point.
We require that the verifiers have private and authenticated channels among them-
selves, which allow them to coordinate their actions by communicating before, during,
or after protocol execution. We stress, however, that this assumption does not hold
for the communication between the verifiers and P : Pˆ has full control over messages
communicated between the verifiers and P (both ways). In particular, the verifiers
do not know per se if they are communicating with the honest or a dishonest prover
(or a coalition of dishonest provers).
We stress that in our model, the honest prover P has no advantage over the
dishonest provers beyond being at position pos. In particular, P does not share any
secret information with the verifiers, nor can he per se authenticate his messages by
any other means.
2For instance, in the case of noise, one would have to introduce some error-correction mechanism
for the honest parties, whereas one would still want to prove security against dishonest parties that
are not affected by noise. This is because even if there is noise in practice, if possible we do not want
to base the security on that.
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For our positive results, we consider a restricted model, which prohibits entangle-
ment between the dishonest provers. Specifically, the No-PE model is such that the
dishonest provers enter every new round of communication, initiated by the verifiers,
with no preshared entanglement. That is, in every round, a dishonest prover can
distribute an entangled quantum state only after it receives the verifier’s message,
and the dishonest provers cannot maintain such an entangled state in order to use
it in the next round. As mentioned in the introduction, considering this simple (but
possibly unrealistic) model may help in obtaining protocols that are secure against
adversaries with limited entanglement [46].
3.3. Secure position verification. A position-verification scheme should allow
a prover P at position pos ∈ Rd (in d-dimensional space) to convince a set of k + 1 ver-
ifiers V0, . . . , Vk, who are located at respective positions pos0, . . . , posk ∈ Rd, that he is
indeed at position pos. We assume that P is enclosed by V0, . . . , Vk. We require that
the verifiers jointly accept if an honest prover P is at position pos, and we require that
the verifiers reject with “high” probability in case of a dishonest prover that is not at
position pos. The latter should hold even if the dishonest prover consists of a coalition
of collaborating dishonest provers Pˆ0, . . . , Pˆ at arbitrary positions apos0, . . . , apos ∈
R
d with aposi = pos for all i. We refer the reader to [16] for the general formal
definition of the completeness and security of a position-verification scheme. In this
paper, we mainly focus on position-verification schemes of the following form.
Definition 3.1. A one-round position-verification scheme PV = (Chlg,Resp,
Ver) consists of the following three parts: A challenge generator Chlg, which outputs
a list of challenges (ch0, . . . , chk) and auxiliary information x; a response algorithm
Resp, which on input a list of challenges outputs a list of responses (x′0, . . . , x
′
k); and
a verification algorithm Ver with Ver(x′0, . . . , x
′
k, x) ∈ {0, 1}.
PV is said to have perfect completeness if Ver(x′0, . . . , x
′
k, x) = 1 with probabil-
ity 1 for (ch0, . . . , chk) and x generated by Chlg and (x
′
0, . . . , x
′
k) by Resp on input
(ch0, . . . , chk).
The algorithms Chlg, Resp, and Ver are used as described in Figure 3.1 to verify
the claimed position of a prover P . We clarify that in order to have all the challenges
arrive at P ’s (claimed) location pos at the same time, the verifiers agree on a time T
and each Vi sends off his challenge chi at time T − d(posi, pos). As a result, all chi’s
arrive at P ’s position pos at time T . In step 3, Vi receives x
′
i in time if x
′
i arrives
at Vi’s position posi at time T + d(posi, pos). Throughout the paper, we use this
simplified terminology. Furthermore, we are sometimes a bit sloppy in distinguishing
a party, like P , from its location pos.
We stress that we allow Chlg, Resp, and Ver to be quantum algorithms and
chi, x, and x
′
i to be quantum information. In our constructions, only ch0 will ac-
tually be quantum; thus, we will only require quantum communication from V0 to P ;
all other communication is classical. Also, in our constructions, x′0 = · · · = x′k, and
Ver(x′0, . . . , x
′
k, x) = 1 exactly if x
′
i = x for all i.
Definition 3.2. A one-round position-verification scheme PV = (Chlg,Resp,Ver)
is called ε-sound if for any position pos ∈ Hull(pos0, . . . , posk), and any coalition of
dishonest provers Pˆ0, . . . , Pˆ at arbitrary positions apos0, . . . , apos, all = pos, when
executing the scheme from Figure 3.1 the verifiers accept with probability at most ε.
We write PVε for such a protocol.
A position-verification scheme can also be understood as a (position-based) iden-
tification scheme, where the identification is not done by means of a cryptographic
key or a password, but by means of the geographical location.
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Common input to the verifiers: Their respective positions pos0, . . . , posk and P ’s
(claimed) position pos.
0. V0 generates a list of challenges (ch0, . . . , chk) and auxiliary information x using
Chlg and privately sends chi to Vi for i = 1, . . . , k.
1. Every Vi sends chi to P in such a way that all chi’s arrive at the same time at
P ’s position pos.
2. P computes (x′0, . . . , x
′
k) := Resp(ch0, . . . , chk) as soon as all the chi’s arrive,
and he sends x′i to Vi for every i.
3. The Vi’s jointly accept if and only if all Vi’s receive x
′
i in time and
Ver(x′0, . . . , x
′
k, x) = 1.
Fig. 3.1. Generic one-round position-verification scheme.
4. Instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation. In order to analyze the
(in)security of position-verification schemes, we first address a more general task,
which is interesting in its own right: instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation.3
Consider the following problem, involving two parties Alice and Bob. Alice holds A
and Bob holds B of a tripartite system ABE that is in some unknown state |ψ〉. The
goal is to apply a known unitary transformation U to AB, but without using any
communication—just by local operations. In general, such a task is clearly impossi-
ble, as it violates the nonsignaling principle [19]. The goal of instantaneous nonlocal
quantum computation is to achieve almost the above but without violating nonsignal-
ing. Specifically, the goal is for Alice and Bob to compute, without communication,
a state |ϕ′〉 that coincides with |ϕ〉 = (U ⊗ IE)|ψ〉 up to local and qubitwise operations
on A and B (that is, tensor products of operators on qubits), where IE denotes the
identity on E.4 Furthermore, these local and qubitwise operations are determined by
classical information that Alice and Bob obtain as part of their actions. In particu-
lar, if Alice and Bob share their classical information, which can be done with one
round of communication (where a “round” means a simultaneous mutual exchange
of messages), then they can transform |ϕ′〉 into |ϕ〉 = (U ⊗ IE)|ψ〉 by local qubitwise
operations. Following ideas by Vaidman [47], we show below that instantaneous non-
local quantum computation, as described above, is possible if Alice and Bob share
sufficiently many EPR pairs.
In the following, let HA, HB, and HE be Hilbert spaces where the former two
consist of nA and nB qubits, respectively, i.e., HA = (C2)⊗nA and HB = (C2)⊗nB .
Furthermore, let U be a unitary matrix acting on HA ⊗ HB. Alice holds system A,
and Bob holds system B of an arbitrary and unknown state |ψ〉 ∈ HABE = HA ⊗
HB ⊗HE . Additionally, Alice and Bob share an arbitrary but finite number of EPR
pairs.
Theorem 4.1. For every unitary U and for every ε > 0, given sufficiently many
shared EPR pairs, there exist local operations A and B, acting on Alice’s and Bob’s
respective sides, with the following property. For any initial state |ψ〉 ∈ HABE, the
joint execution A⊗B transforms |ψ〉 into |ϕ′〉 and provides classical outputs k to Alice
and 	 to Bob, such that the following holds except with probability ε. The state |ϕ′〉
3This is an extension of the task of “instantaneous measurement of nonlocal variables” introduced
by Vaidman [47].
4The requirement on the local operations to be qubit-wise is not essential, but it simplifies matters.
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coincides with |ϕ〉 = (U ⊗ IE)|ψ〉 up to local qubitwise operations on A and B that are
determined by k and 	.
We stress that A acts on A as well as on Alice’s shares of the EPR pairs, and the
corresponding holds for B. Furthermore, being equal up to local qubitwise operations
on A and B means that |ϕ〉 = (V Ak, ⊗V Bk, ⊗ IE)|ϕ′〉, where {V Ak,}k, and {V Bk,}k, are
fixed families of unitaries which act qubitwise on HA and HB, respectively. In our
construction, the V Ak, and V
B
k,’s will actually be tensor products of one-qubit Pauli
operators.
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.1, we get the following.
Corollary 4.2. For every unitary U and for every ε > 0, given sufficiently
many shared EPR pairs, there exists a nonlocal operation AB for Alice and Bob which
consists of local operations and one round of mutual communication, such that for
any initial state |ψ〉 ∈ HABE of the tripartite system ABE, the joint execution of AB
transforms |ψ〉 into |ϕ〉 = (U ⊗ IE)|ψ〉, except with probability ε.
For technical reasons, we will actually prove the following extension of Theo-
rem 4.1, which is easily seen to be equivalent. The difference from Theorem 4.1 is
that Alice and Bob are additionally given classical inputs: x to Alice and y to Bob,
and the unitary U that is to be applied to the quantum input depends on x and y.
In the statement below, x ranges over some arbitrary but fixed finite set X , and y
ranges over some arbitrary but fixed finite set Y.
Theorem 4.3. For every family {Ux,y} of unitaries and for every ε > 0, given
sufficiently many shared EPR pairs, there exist families {Ax} and {By} of local oper-
ations, acting on Alice’s and Bob’s respective sides, with the following property. For
any initial state |ψ〉 ∈ HABE and for every x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, the joint execution
Ax ⊗ By transforms the state |ψ〉 into |ϕ′〉 and provides classical outputs k to Alice
and 	 to Bob, such that the following holds except with probability ε. The state |ϕ′〉
coincides with |ϕ〉 = (Ux,y ⊗ IE)|ψ〉 up to local qubitwise operations on A and B that
are determined by k and 	.
The solution works by “teleporting” states back and forth in a clever way [47], but
without communicating the respective classical outcomes of the Bell measurements,
so that only local operations are performed. More precisely, the respective sender
makes a Bell measurement, resulting in some classical information, but he does not
(yet) communicate the outcome to the receiver, and the receiver takes his share of the
EPR pair as the received state, but does not/cannot (yet) correct it. To emphasize
this difference from standard teleportation, we refer to it as teleportation∗ (with an
asterisk) in the proof below.
There is a small probability that the classical outcomes of the Bell measurement
indicate that the receiver holds exactly the original state (no correction is needed). In
this case he can perform the unitary on the joint state, and the parties are practically
done (although they do not know that they are done). Otherwise, the parties still
need to perform the unitary and in addition to correct the effect caused by the Bell
measurement. This can be seen as performing a new unitary on their joint state, such
that the new unitary takes into account both the original unitary and the corrections
needed due to the Bell measurement. The parties now repeat the process with this
new unitary.
Note that the sender knows when the teleported∗ state needs no correction, but
the receiver does not. Thus, the receiver always performs the unitary and then
teleports∗ the result back to the sender, who can decide whether to continue the
scheme with an updated unitary, or stop (the receiver side always continues, yet if the
sender has stopped, any further actions are meaningless). At the end (after a fixed
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number of rounds performed by the receiver) the parties communicate all the classical
information gathered along the scheme. This allows them to perform the correction
of the final teleportation∗ of the scheme.
Another crucial trick, due to Vaidman [47], that is used in the above approach
is as follows. Before Alice actually teleports∗ her state to Bob, they prepare a list of
“teleportation∗ channels,” one for each possible choice of x, and Alice then teleports∗
her state using the channel that is labeled by her actual input x, whereas Bob applies
Ux′,y to the channel labeled by x
′ for every possible x′. This way, Bob applies the
right unitary (to the right state) without Alice having to communicate x to him.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. To simplify notation, we assume that the joint state of A
and B is pure, and thus we may ignore system E. However, all our arguments also
hold in case the state of A and B is entangled with E.
Next, we observe that it is sufficient to prove Theorem 4.3 for the case where B is
“empty,” i.e., dimHB = 1 and thus nB = 0. Indeed, if this is not the case, Alice and
Bob can do the following. Bob first teleports∗ B to Alice. We stress that the asterisk
means that Bob does not communicate the outcome of the Bell measurements. Now,
Alice holds A′ = AB with nA′ = nA + nB, and Bob’s system has collapsed, and
thus Bob holds no quantum state anymore but only classical information. Then, they
do the nonlocal computation, and in the end Alice teleports∗ B back to Bob. The
modification to the state of B introduced by teleporting∗ it to Alice can be taken care
of by modifying the set of unitaries {Ux,y} accordingly (and making it dependent on
Bob’s measurement outcome, thereby extending the set Y). Also, the modification to
the state ofB introduced by teleporting∗ it back to Bob does not harm the requirement
of the joint state being equal to |ϕ〉 = Ux,y|ψ〉 up to local qubitwise operations.
Hence, from now on, we may assume that B is “empty,” and we write n for nA.
Next, we describe the core of how the local operations Ax and By work. To simplify
notation, we assume that X = {1, . . . ,m}. Recall that Alice and Bob share (many)
EPR pairs. We may assume that the EPR pairs are grouped into groups of size n;
each such group we call a teleportation channel. Furthermore, we may assume that m
of these teleportation channels are labeled by the numbers 1 up to m and that another
m of these teleportation channels are labeled by the numbers m+ 1 up to 2m.
1. Alice teleports∗ |ψ〉 to Bob, using the teleportation channel that is labeled by
her input x. Let us denote her measurement outcome by k◦ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n.
2. For every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Bob does the following. He applies the unitary Ui,y
to the n qubits that make up his share of the EPR pairs given by the tele-
portation channel labeled i. Then, he teleports∗ the resulting state to Alice
using the teleportation channel labeled m+ i. We denote the corresponding
measurement outcome by 	◦,i.
3. Alice specifies the n qubits that make up her share of the EPR pairs given
by the teleportation channel labeled m+ x to be the state |ϕ′〉.
Let us analyze the above. With probability 1/4n, namely, if k◦ = 0 · · · 0, tele-
porting∗ |ψ〉 to Bob leaves the state unchanged. In this case, it is easy to see that the
resulting state |ϕ′〉 satisfies the required property of being identical to |ϕ〉 = Ux,y|ψ〉
up to local qubitwise operations determined by 	◦,x and thus determined by x and
	◦ = (	◦,1, . . . , 	◦,m). This proves the claim for the case where ε ≥ 1− 1/4n.
We show how to reduce ε. The crucial observation is that if in the above procedure
k◦ = 0 · · · 0, and thus |ϕ′〉 is not necessarily identical to |ϕ〉 up to local qubitwise
operations, then
|ϕ′〉 = (V◦,xUx,yVk◦ ⊗ IE)|ψ〉 = (V◦,xUx,yVk◦U †x,y ⊗ IE)|ϕ〉,
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where V◦,x and Vk◦ are tensor products of Pauli matrices acting on HA ⊗HB. Thus,
setting |ψ′〉 := |ϕ′〉, x′ := (x, k◦), y′ := (y, 	◦), and U ′x′,y′ := Ux,yVk◦U †x,yV◦,x , the
state |ϕ〉 can be written as |ϕ〉 = (U ′x′,y′ ⊗ IE)|ψ′〉. This means we are back to the
original problem of applying a unitary, U ′x′,y′ , to a state, |ψ′〉, held by Alice, where
the unitary depends on classical information x′ and y′, known by Alice and Bob,
respectively. Thus, we can reapply the above procedure to the new problem instance.
Note that in the new problem instance, the classical inputs x′ and y′ come from larger
sets than the original inputs x and y, but the new quantum input, |ψ′〉, has the same
number of qubits, n. Therefore, reapplying the procedure will succeed with the same
probability 1/4n.
As there is a constant probability of success in each round, reapplying the above
procedure sufficiently many times to the resulting new problem instances guarantees
that, except with arbitrarily small probability, the state |ϕ′〉 will be of the required
form at some point (when Alice gets k◦ = 0 · · · 0). Say this is the case at the end
of the jth iteration. Then, Alice stops with her part of the procedure at this point,
keeps the state |ϕ′〉, and specifies k to consist of j and of her classical input into the
jth iteration (which consists of x and of the k◦’s from the prior j − 1 iterations).
Since, Bob does not learn whether an iteration is successful or not, he has to keep
on reiterating up to some bound, and in the end he specifies 	 to consist of the 	◦’s
collected over all the iterations. The state |ϕ′〉 equals |ϕ〉 = (Ux,y⊗ IE)|ψ〉 up to local
qubitwise operations that are determined by k and 	.
The number of EPR pairs needed by Alice and Bob in the scheme described in
the proof is doubly exponential in nA+nB, the number of qubits that make the joint
quantum system.5 In recent subsequent work, Beigi and Ko¨nig [3] used a different kind
of quantum teleportation by Ishizaka and Hiroshima [25, 26] to reduce the amount
of entanglement needed to perform instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation to
exponential in the number of qubits of the joint quantum system. It remains an
interesting open question whether such an exponentially large amount of entanglement
is necessary.
In Appendix B, we explain how to perform instantaneous nonlocal quantum com-
putation among more than two parties.
5. Impossibility of unconditional position verification. In this section we
show that no position-verification scheme is secure against a coalition of quantum
adversaries in the standard model specified in section 3.2. For simplicity, we consider
the 1-dimensional case, with two verifiers V0 and V1, but the attack can be generalized
to higher dimensions and more verifiers.
We consider an arbitrary position-verification scheme in our model (as specified
in section 3). We recall that in this model, the verifiers must base their decision
solely on what the prover replies and how long it takes him to reply, and the honest
prover has no advantage over a coalition of dishonest provers beyond being at the
claimed position.6 Such a position-verification scheme may be of the form specified
in Figure 3.1 but may also be made up of several, possibly interleaved, rounds of
interaction between the prover and the verifiers.
5The probability that teleporting* needs no correction is 4−(nA+nB); hence, the basic scheme
needs to be executed about 4nA+nB times. Furthermore, in every execution, the number of required
“teleportation channels” grows by a factor 4nA+nB . See [3] for a detailed calculation.
6In particular, the prover does not share any secret information with the verifiers, differentiating
our setting from models as described, for example, in [28].
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For the honest prover P , such a general scheme consists of steps that look as
follows. P holds a local quantum register R, which is set to some default value at
the beginning of the scheme. In each step, P obtains a system A from V0 along
with some classical information x; simultaneously, he gets a system B from V1 and
some classical information y. The separation between classical and quantum inputs is
convenient for technical reasons similar to those in section 4. In addition, V0 and V1
jointly keep some system E. Let |ψ〉 be the state of the four-partite system ABRE;
it is determined by the scheme and by the step within the scheme we are focusing on.
P has to apply a unitary transformation Ux,y that depends on x and y to ABR and
send the (transformed) systems A and B back to V0 and V1 (and keep R). Note that,
after the transformation, the state of ABRE is given by |ϕ〉 = (Ux,y ⊗ IE)|ψ〉.
We show that a coalition of two dishonest provers Pˆ0 and Pˆ1, where Pˆ0 is located
in between V0 and P and Pˆ1 is located in between V1 and P , can perfectly simulate
the actions of the honest prover P , and therefore it is impossible for the verifiers
to distinguish between an honest prover at position pos and a coalition of dishonest
provers at positions different from pos. The simulation of the dishonest provers per-
fectly imitates the computation as well as the timing of an honest P . Since in our
model this information is what the verifiers have to base their decision on, the general
impossibility of position-verification in our model follows.
Consider a step in the scheme as described above, but now from the point of view
of Pˆ0 and Pˆ1. Since Pˆ0 is closer to V0, she will first receive A and x; similarly, Pˆ1
will first receive B and y. We specify that Pˆ1 takes care of and maintains the local
register R. If the step we consider is the first step in the scheme, the state of ABRE
equals |ψ〉, as in the case of an honest P . In order to have an invariant that holds for
all the steps, we actually relax this statement and merely observe that the state of
ABRE, say, |ψ′〉, equals |ψ〉 up to local and qubitwise operations on the subsystem R,
determined by classical information x◦ and y◦, where Pˆ0 holds x◦ and Pˆ1 holds y◦.
This invariant clearly holds for the first step in the scheme, when R is in some default
state, and we will show that it also holds for the other steps.
By Theorem 4.3, it follows that without communication (just by instantaneous
local operations), Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 can transform the state |ψ′〉 into a state |ϕ′〉 that coincides
with |ϕ〉 = (Ux,y ⊗ IE)|ψ〉 up to local and qubitwise transformations on A, B, and R,
determined by classical information k (known to Pˆ0) and 	 (known to Pˆ1). Note that
the initial state is not |ψ〉 but rather a state of the form |ψ′〉 = (Vx◦,y◦ ⊗IE)|ψ〉, where
x◦ is known to Pˆ0 and y◦ to Pˆ1. Thus, Theorem 4.3 is actually applied to the unitary
U ′x′,y′ = Ux,yV
†
x◦,y◦ , where x
′ = (x◦, x) and y′ = (y◦, y). Given |ϕ′〉, k, and 	, the
parties Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 can exchange k and 	 using one mutual round of communication
and transform |ϕ′〉 into |ϕ′′〉 which coincides with |ϕ〉 up to qubitwise operations only
on R and send A to V0 and B to V1. It follows that the state of ABE and the time it
took Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 for the computation and communication are identical to those of an
honest P ; i.e., Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 have perfectly simulated this step of the scheme.
Finally, we see that the invariant is satisfied, when moving on to the next step in
the scheme, where Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 receive new A and B (along with new classical x and y)
from V0 and V1, respectively. Even if this new round interleaves with the previous
round in that the new A and B, etc., arrive before Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 have finished exchanging
(the old) k and 	, it still holds that the state of ABRE is as in the case of honest P
up to qubitwise operations on the subsystem R. It follows that the above procedure
works for all the steps and thus that Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 can indeed perfectly simulate honest
P ’s actions throughout the whole scheme.
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6. Secure position-verification in the No-PE model.
6.1. Basic scheme and its analysis. In this section we show the possibility
of secure position-verification in the No-PE model. We consider the following basic
one-round position-verification scheme, given in Figure 6.1. It is based on the BB84
encoding.
0. V0 chooses two random bits x, θ ∈ {0, 1} and privately sends them to V1.
1. V0 prepares the qubit H
θ|x〉 and sends it to P , and V1 sends the bit θ to P , so
that Hθ|x〉 and θ arrive at the same time at P .
2. When Hθ|x〉 and θ arrive, P measures Hθ|x〉 in basis θ to observe x′ ∈ {0, 1}
and sends x′ to V0 and V1.
3. V0 and V1 accept if on both sides x
′ arrives in time and x′ = x.
Fig. 6.1. Position-verification scheme PVBB84 based on the BB84 encoding.
We implicitly specify that parties abort if they receive any message that is incon-
sistent with the protocol, for instance, (classical) messages with a wrong length, or
different number of received qubits than expected.
Theorem 6.1. The one-round position-verification scheme PVBB84 from Fig-
ure 6.1 is ε-sound with ε = 1− h−1(12 ) in the No-PE model.
Recall that h denotes the binary entropy function and h−1 its inverse on the
branch 0 ≤ p ≤ 12 . A numerical calculation shows that h−1(12 ) ≥ 0.11 and thus
ε ≤ 0.89. A particular attack for a dishonest prover Pˆ , sitting in between V0 and
P , is to measure the qubit Hθ|x〉 in the Breidbart basis, resulting in an acceptance
probability of cos(π/8)2 ≈ 0.85. This shows that our analysis is pretty tight.
Proof. In order to analyze the position-verification scheme it is convenient to con-
sider an equivalent purified version, given in Figure 6.2. The only difference between
the original and the purified scheme is the preparation of the bit Hθ|x〉. In the pu-
rified version, it is done by preparing |ΦAB〉 = (|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉)/
√
2 and measuring A
in basis θ. This way of preparation changes the point in time when V0 measures A
and the point in time when V1 learns x. This, however, has no influence on the view
of the (dishonest or honest) prover, nor on the joint distribution of θ, x, and x′, and
thus nor on the probability that V0 and V1 accept. It therefore suffices to analyze the
purified version.
0. V0 and V1 privately agree on a random bit θ ∈ {0, 1}.
1. V0 prepares an EPR pair |ΦAB〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB, keeps qubit A, and sends B to P ,
and V1 sends the bit θ to P , so that B and θ arrive at the same time at P .
2. When B and θ arrive, P measures B in basis θ to observe x′ ∈ {0, 1} and sends
x′ to V0 and V1.
3. Only now, when x′ arrives, V0 measures A in basis θ to observe x and privately
sends x to V1. V0 and V1 accept if on both sides x
′ arrives in time and x′ = x.
Fig. 6.2. EPR version of PVBB84.
We first consider security against two dishonest provers Pˆ0 and Pˆ1, where Pˆ0 is
between V0 and P and Pˆ1 is between V1 and P . In the end we will argue that a similar
argument holds for multiple dishonest provers on either side.
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Since V0 and V1 do not accept if x
′ does not arrive in time and dishonest provers
do not use preshared entanglement in the No-PE-model, any potentially successful
strategy of Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 must look as follows. As soon as Pˆ1 receives the bit θ from V1,
she forwards (a copy of) it to Pˆ0. Also, as soon as Pˆ0 receives the qubit A, she applies
an arbitrary quantum operation to the received qubit A (and maybe some ancillary
system she possesses) that maps it into a bipartite state E0E1 (with arbitrary state
spaceHE0⊗HE1), and Pˆ0 keeps E0 and sends E1 to Pˆ1. Then, as soon as Pˆ0 receives θ,
she applies some measurement (which may depend on θ) to E0 to obtain xˆ0, and as
soon as Pˆ1 receives E1, she applies some measurement (which may depend on θ) to
E1 to obtain xˆ1, and both send xˆ0 and xˆ1 immediately to V0 and V1, respectively.
We will argue that the probability that xˆ0 = x and xˆ1 = x is upper bounded by ε as
claimed.
Let |ψAE0E1〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HE0 ⊗ HE1 be the state of the tripartite system AE0E1
after Pˆ0 has applied the quantum operation to the qubit B. Note that in the No-PE
model, the quantum operation does not depend on θ. Therefore, the global state
|ψAE0E1〉 does not depend on θ.7 Recall that x is obtained by measuring A in either
the computational (if θ = 0) or the Hadamard (if θ = 1) basis. Writing x, θ, etc.
as random variables X , Θ, etc., it follows from CIT (specifically Corollary 2.5) that
H(X |ΘE0)+H(X |ΘE1) ≥ 1 . Let Y0 and Y1 denote the classical information obtained
by Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 as a result of measuring E0 and E1, respectively, with bases that may
depend on Θ. By the (generalized) Holevo bound Theorem 2.2, it follows from the
above that
H(X |ΘY0) + H(X |ΘY1) ≥ 1;
therefore, H(X |ΘYi) ≥ 12 for at least one i ∈ {0, 1}. By Fano’s inequality (Theo-
rem 2.3), we can conclude that the corresponding error probability qi = P [Xˆi =X ]
satisfies h(qi) ≥ 12 . It thus follows that the failure probability
q = P [Xˆ0 =X ∨ Xˆ1 =X ] ≥ max {q0, q1} ≥ h−1
(
1
2
)
,
and the probability of V0 and V1 accepting, P [Xˆ0=X ∧ Xˆ1=X ] = 1− q, is indeed
upper bounded by ε, as claimed.
It remains to argue that more than two dishonest provers in the No-PE model
cannot do any better. The reasoning is the same as above. Namely, in order to
respond in time, the dishonest provers that are closer to V0 than P must map the
qubit A—possibly jointly—into a bipartite state E0E1 without knowing θ and jointly
keep E0 and send E1 to the dishonest provers that are “on the other side” of P (i.e.,
closer to V1). Then, the reply for V0 needs to be computed from E0 and θ (possibly
jointly by the dishonest provers that are closer to V0), and the response for V1 from
E1 and θ. Thus, it can be argued as above that the success probability is bounded
by ε as claimed.
6.2. Reducing the soundness error. In order to obtain a position-verification
scheme with a negligible soundness error, we can simply repeat the one-round scheme
7We stress that this independence breaks down if Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 start off with an entangled state,
because then Pˆ1 can act on his part of the entangled state in a θ-dependent way, which makes the
overall state dependent on θ.
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PVBB84 from Figure 6.1. Repeating the scheme n times in sequence, where the verifiers
launch the next execution only after the previous one is finished, reduces the soundness
error to εn. Recall that in the No-PE model defined in section 3.2, the adversaries
must start every round without preshared entanglement. Therefore, the security of the
sequentially repeated scheme follows immediately from the security of the one-round
scheme.
Corollary 6.2. In the No-PE model, the n-fold sequential repetition of PVBB84
from Figure 6.1 is εn-sound with ε = 1− h−1(12 ).
In terms of round complexity, a more efficient way of repeating PVBB84 is by
repeating it in parallel: V0 sends n BB84 qubits H
θ1 |x1〉, . . . , Hθn |xn〉, and V1 sends
the corresponding bases θ1, . . . , θn to P so that they all arrive at the same time at P ’s
position, and P needs to reply with the correct list x1, . . . , xn in time. This protocol is
obviously more efficient in terms of round complexity and appears to be the preferred
solution. However, we do not have a proof for the security of the parallel repetition
of PVBB84.
6.3. Position-verification in higher dimensions. The scheme PVBB84 can
easily be extended into higher spatial dimensions. The scheme for d-dimensional
space is a generalization of the scheme PVBB84 in Figure 6.1, where the challenges
of the verifiers V1, V2, . . . , Vd form a sum sharing of the basis θ, i.e., are random
θ1, θ2, . . . , θd ∈ {0, 1} such that their modulo-2 sum equals θ. As specified in Fig-
ure 3.1, the state Hθ|x〉 and the shares θi are sent by the verifiers to P such that
they arrive at P ’s (claimed) position at the same time. P can reconstruct θ and
measure Hθ|x〉 in the correct basis to obtain x′ = x, which he sends to all the verifiers
who check if x′ arrives in time and equals x.
We can argue security by a reduction to the scheme in one dimension. For the
sake of concreteness, we consider three dimensions. For three dimensions, we need
a set of (at least) four noncoplanar verifiers V0, . . . , V3, and the prover P needs to
be located inside the tetrahedron defined by the positions of the four verifiers. We
consider a coalition of dishonest provers Pˆ0, . . . , Pˆ at arbitrary positions but different
from P . We may assume that Pˆ0 is closest to V0. It is easy to see that there exists a
verifier Vj such that d(Pˆ0, Vj) > d(P, Vj). Furthermore, we may assume that Vj is not
V0, and thus we assume for concreteness that it is V1. We strengthen the dishonest
provers by giving them θ2 and θ3 for free from the beginning. Since, when θ2 and θ3
are given, θ can be computed from θ1 and vice versa, we may assume that V1 actually
sends θ as a challenge rather than θ1. But now, θ2 and θ3 are just two random bits,
independent of θ and x, and are thus of no help to the dishonest provers, and we can
safely ignore them.
As Pˆ0 is further away from V1 than P is, Pˆ0 cannot afford to store H
θ|x〉 until
she has learned θ. Indeed, otherwise V1 will not get a reply in time. Therefore, before
she learns θ, Pˆ0 needs to apply a quantum transformation to H
θ|x〉 with a bipartite
output and keep one part of the output, E0, and send the other part, E1, to Pˆ1. Note
that this quantum transformation is independent of θ as long as Pˆ0 does not share an
entangled state with the other dishonest provers (who might know θ by now). Then,
xˆ0 and xˆ1, the replies that are sent to V0 and V1, respectively, need to be computed
from θ and E0 alone and from θ and E1 alone. It follows from the analysis of the
scheme in one dimension that the probability that both xˆ0 and xˆ1 coincide with x is
at most ε = 1− h−1(12 ).
Corollary 6.3. The above generalization of PVBB84 to d dimensions is ε-sound
in the No-PE model with ε = 1− h−1(12 ).
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7. Position-based authentication and key exchange. In this section we
consider a new primitive: position-based authentication. In contrast to position-
verification, where the goal of the verifiers is to make sure that entity P is at the
claimed location pos, the verifiers want to make sure that a given messagem originates
from an entity P that is at the claimed location pos. We stress that it is not sufficient
to first execute a position-verification scheme with P to ensure that P is at position pos
and then have P send or confirm m, because a coalition of dishonest provers may do
a man-in-the-middle attack and stay passive during the execution of the position-
verification scheme but modify the communicated message m.
Formally, in a position-based authentication scheme the prover takes as input a
messagem (that can be empty), and the verifiers V0, . . . , Vk take as input a messagem
′
and the claimed position pos of P , and we require the following security properties.
εc-completeness. If m = m
′, P is honest and at the claimed position pos, and if there
is no (coalition of) dishonest prover(s), then the verifiers jointly accept except
with probability εc.
εs-soundness. For any pos ∈ Hull(pos0, . . . , posk) and for any coalition of dishonest
provers Pˆ0, . . . , Pˆ at locations all different to pos, if m = m′, the verifiers
jointly reject except with probability εs.
We stress that soundness should hold even when an honest prover is located at pos
(but also when there is no honest prover at pos). Furthermore, in the case of a man-
in-the-middle attack P , recall that the adversary fully controls P ’s clock; thus the
adversary can temporarily stop P from executing its program or “fast forward” P ’s
program to a later point (but the adversary cannot reset P and make P rerun its
program from its starting point).
We build a position-based authentication scheme based on our position-verification
scheme. The idea is to incorporate the message to be authenticated into the replies
of the position-verification scheme. Our construction is very generic and may also be
useful for turning other kinds of identification schemes (not necessarily position-based
schemes) into corresponding authentication schemes. Our aim is merely to show the
existence of such a scheme; we do not strive for optimization. We begin by proposing
a weak position-based authentication scheme for a 1-bit message m.
7.1. Weak 1-bit authentication scheme. Let PVε be a one-round position-
verification scheme between k + 1 verifiers V0, . . . , Vk and a prover P . For simplicity
we assume, like in the scheme PVBB84 of section 6, that x and x
′
0, . . . , x
′
k are classical
(but chi are quantum), and Ver accepts if x
′
i = x for all i, and thus we understand the
output of Resp(ch0, . . . , chk) as a single element x
′ (supposed to be x). We require PVε
to have perfect completeness and soundness ε < 1. We let ⊥ be some special symbol.
We consider the weak authentication scheme given in Figure 7.1 for a 1-bit message
m ∈ {0, 1}. We assume that m has already been communicated to the verifiers and
thus there is agreement among the verifiers on the message to be authenticated. The
weak authentication scheme works by executing the one-round position-verification
scheme PVε, but letting P replace his response x′ by ⊥ with probability q, to be
specified later.
We analyze the success probability of an adversary authenticating a bit m′ ∈
{0, 1}. We consider both the case where there is no honest prover present (we call
this an impersonation attack), and the case where an honest prover is active and
authenticates the bit m = m′ (we call this a substitution attack).
The following properties are easy to verify and follow from the security property
of PVε.
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Let PVε = (Chlg,Resp,Ver) be a perfect-complete and ε-sound 1-round position-
verification scheme.
0. V0 generates (ch0, . . . , chk) and x using Chlg and sends chi and x to Vi for
i = 1, . . . , k.
1. Every verifier Vi sends chi to P in such a way that all chi’s arrive at the same
time at P .
2. When the chi’s arrive, P computes the authentication tag t as follows and
sends it back to all the verifiers.
If m = 1, then t := Resp(ch0, . . . , chk). If m = 0, then t := ⊥ with probability q
and t := Resp(ch0, . . . , chk) otherwise.
3. If different verifiers have received different values for t, or the replies did not
arrive in time, the verifiers abort. Otherwise, they jointly accept if t = x or
both m = 0 and t = ⊥.
Fig. 7.1. Generic position-based weak authentication scheme wAUTHε,q for 1-bit message m.
Lemma 7.1. Let Pˆ be a coalition of dishonest provers not at the claimed position
and trying to authenticate message m′ = 1. In case of an impersonation attack, the
verifiers accept with probability at most ε, and in case of a substitution attack (with
m = 0), the verifiers accept with probability at most δ = (1−q)+qε = 1−q(1−ε) < 1.
On the other hand, Pˆ can obviously authenticate m′ = 0 by means of a substi-
tution attack with success probability 1; however, informally, Pˆ has bounded success
probability in authenticating message m′ = 0 by means of an impersonation attack
unless she uses the tag ⊥. (This fact is used later to obtain a strong authentication
scheme.)
Let us try to extend the above in order to get a strong authentication scheme.
Based on the observation that by performing a substitution attack on wAUTHε,q, it is
easy to substitute the message bit m = 1 by m′ = 0 but nontrivial to substitute m = 0
by m′ = 1, a first approach to obtain an authentication scheme with good security
might be to apply wAUTHε,q bitwise to a balanced encoding of the message. Such
an encoding should ensure that for any distinct messages m and m′, there are many
positions in which the encoding of m′ is 1 but the encoding of m is 0. Unfortunately,
this is not good enough. The reason is that P and the verifiers are not necessarily
synchronized. For instance, assume we encode m = 0 into c = 010101 . . .01 and
m′ = 1 into c′ = 101010 . . .10, and authentication works by doing wAUTHε,q bitwise
on all the bits of the encoded message. If Pˆ wants to substitute m = 0 bym′ = 1, then
she can simply do the following. She tries to authenticate the first bit 1 of c′ toward
the verifiers by means of an impersonation attack. If she succeeds, which she can with
constant probability, she simply authenticates the remaining bits 01010 . . .10 of c′ by
using P , who is happy to authenticate all of the bits of c = 010101 . . .01. Because of
this issue of Pˆ bringing P and the verifiers out of sync, we need to be more careful
about the exact encoding we use.
7.2. Secure position-based authentication scheme. We specify a special
class of codes, which is strong enough for our purpose.
Definition 7.2. Let c ∈ {0, 1}N . A vector e ∈ {−1, 0, 1}2N is called an
embedding of c if by removing all the −1 entries in e we obtain c. Furthermore,
for two strings c, c′ ∈ {0, 1}N we say that c′ λ-dominates c if for all embeddings e
and e′ of c and c′ (at least) one of the following holds: (a) the number of positions
i ∈ {1, . . . , 2N} for which e′i = 1 and ei < 1 is at least λ, or (b) there exists a
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consecutive sequence of indices I such that the set J = {i ∈ I : e′i > −1} has size
|J | ≥ 4λ and it contains at least λ indices i ∈ J with ei = −1.
For instance, let c = 00 . . . 0 11 . . .1 and c′ = 11 . . . 1 00 . . .0, where the blocks of
0’s and 1’s are of length N/2. It is not hard to see that the two codewords N/4-
dominate each other. However, c˜′ = 0101 . . .01 does not dominate c˜ = 1010 . . .10,
since c˜′ can be embedded into ‡0101 . . .01‡‡ . . . ‡ and c˜ into 1010 . . .10‡‡ . . . ‡, where
here and later we use ‡ to represent −1.
Definition 7.3. A code C ⊆ {0, 1}N is λ-dominating if any two codewords in C
λ-dominate each other.
We note that the requirement for λ-dominating codes can be relaxed in various
ways to allow a greater range of codes.
Let wAUTHε,q be the above weak authentication scheme satisfying Lemma 7.1.
In order to authenticate a message m ∈ {0, 1}μ in a strong way (with λ a security
parameter), an encoding c of m using a λ-dominating code C is bitwise authenticated
by means of wAUTHε,q, and the verifiers perform statistics over the number of ⊥’s
received. The resulting authentication scheme is given in Figure 7.2; as for the weak
scheme, we assume that the message m has already been communicated.
0. P and the verifiers encode m into a codeword c = (c1, . . . , cN ) ∈ C for a
λ-dominating code C.
1. For j = 1, . . . , N , the following is repeated in sequence.
1.1 P authenticates cj by means of wAUTH
ε,q. Let ti be the corresponding
tag received.
1.2 If j > 4λ, the verifiers compute
n⊥(j) = | {i ∈ {j − 4λ, . . . , j} : ci = 0 ∧ ti = ⊥} |.
2. If any of the wAUTHε,q executions fail, or if n⊥(j) > 8qλ for some round
j > 4λ, the verifiers jointly reject. Otherwise, m is accepted.
Fig. 7.2. A generic position-based authentication scheme AUTHε,q,λ.
Theorem 7.4. The generic position-based authentication scheme AUTHε,q,λ
(Figure 7.2) is Ne−2qλ-complete.
Proof. An honest prover which follows the above scheme can fail only if for some
round r, n⊥ > 8qλ. Using the Chernoff bound [18], the probability of having n⊥ > 8qλ
at a specific round r is upper bounded by e−2qλ. Using the union bound for every
possible round j, we can bound the failure probability with Ne−2qλ.
Before we analyze the security of the authentication scheme, let us discuss the
possible attacks on it. We treat Pˆ as a single identity; however, Pˆ represents a
collaboration of adversaries. Similarly, we refer the k + 1 verifiers as a single en-
tity, V . We point out that we do not assume that honest P and V have synchronized
clocks. Therefore, we allow Pˆ to arbitrarily schedule and interleave the N executions
of wAUTHε,q that V performs with the N executions that P performs. The only
restriction on the scheduling is that P and V perform their executions of wAUTHε,q
in the specified order.
This means that at any point in time during the attack when P has executed
wAUTHε,q for the bits c1, . . . , cj−1 and V has executed wAUTHε,q for the bits c′1,
. . . , c′j′−1 and both are momentarily inactive (at the beginning of the attack j =
j′ = 1), Pˆ can perform one of the following three actions. (1) Activate V to run
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
01
/1
3/
15
 to
 1
92
.1
6.
19
1.
14
0.
 R
ed
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
su
bje
ct 
to 
SIA
M 
lic
en
se 
or 
co
py
rig
ht;
 se
e h
ttp
://w
ww
.si
am
.or
g/j
ou
rna
ls/
ojs
a.p
hp
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © by SIAM. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited. 
172 BUHRMAN ET AL.
wAUTHε,q on c′j′ but not activate P ; this corresponds to an impersonation attack.
(2) Activate V to run wAUTHε,q on c′j′ and activate P to run wAUTH
ε,q on cj ; this
corresponds to a substitution attack if cj = c′j′ . (3) Activate P to run wAUTHε,q on cj
but not activate V ; this corresponds to “fast-forwarding” P . We note that Pˆ ’s choice
on which action to perform may be adaptive and depend on what she has seen so far.
However, since V and P execute wAUTHε,q for each position within c independently,
information gathered from previous executions of wAUTHε,q does not improve Pˆ ’s
success probability to break the next execution.
It is easy to see that any attack with its (adaptive) choices of (1), (2), or (3) leads
to embeddings e and e′ of c and c′, respectively. Indeed, start with empty strings
e = e′ = ∅ and update them as follows. For each of Pˆ ’s rounds, update e by e‡ and
e′ by e′c′j′ if Pˆ chooses (1), update e by ecj and e
′ by e′c′j′ if she chooses (2), and
update e by ecj and e
′ by e′‡ if she chooses (3). In the end, complete e and e′ by
padding them with sufficiently many ‡’s to have them of length 2N . It is clear that
the obtained e and e′ are indeed valid embeddings of c and c′, respectively.
Theorem 7.5. For any ε > 0 and 0 < q < (1 − ε)/8, the generic position-based
authentication scheme AUTHε,q,λ (Figure 7.2) is 2−Ω(λ)-sound in the No-PE model.
Proof. Let m and m′ = m be the messages input by P and the verifiers, re-
spectively, and let c and c′ be their encodings. Furthermore, let e and e′ be their
embeddings, determined (as explained above) by Pˆ ’s attack. By the condition on the
λ-dominating code C we know that one of the two properties (a) or (b) of Defini-
tion 7.2 holds. If (a) holds, the number of positions i ∈ {1, . . . , 2N} for which e′i = 1
and ei ∈ {−1, 0} is λ. In this case, by construction of the embeddings, in his attack
Pˆ needs to authenticate (using wAUTHε,q) the bit 1 at least λ times (by means of an
impersonation or a substitution attack). By Lemma 2, the success probability of Pˆ is
thus at most δλ, which is 2−Ω(λ). In the case where property (b) holds, there exists
a consecutive sequence of indices I such that the set J = {i ∈ I : e′i > −1} has size
|J | ≥ 4λ and contains at least λ indices i ∈ J with ei = −1. For any such index i ∈ J
with ei = −1, Pˆ needs to authenticate (using wAUTHε,q) the bit e′i by means of an
impersonation attack, while he may use ⊥ for (at most) a 8q-fraction of those i’s.
However, by the ε-soundness of PVε, if we require ε < 1 − 8q, the probability of
Pˆ succeeding in this attack is exponentially small in λ.
A possible choice for a dominating code for μ-bit messages is the balanced repeti-
tion code Cμ-BR, obtained by applying the code C-BR = {00 . . .011 . . .1, 11 . . .100 . . .0}
⊂ {0, 1}2 bitwise.
Lemma 7.6. For any 	 and μ, the balanced repetition code Cμ-BR is 	/4-dominating.
Proof. Let c, c′ ∈ {0, 1}2μ be two distinct code words from Cμ-BR, and let e and
e′ be their respective embeddings. Note that c is made up of blocks of 0’s and 1’s of
length 	. Correspondingly, e is made up of blocks of 0’s and 1’s of length 	, with ‡’s
inserted at various positions. Let I1, . . . , I2μ be the index sets that describe these 0
and 1-blocks of e. In other words, they satisfy Ij < Ij+1 elementwise, |Ij | = 	, and
{ei : i ∈ Ij} equals {0} or {1}. Furthermore, the sequence of ei’s with i ∈ I1∪· · ·∪I2μ
equals c, and as such, for any odd j, one of Ij and Ij+1 is a 0-block, and one is a
1-block. Let φ : {1, . . . , μ} → {1, . . . , 2μ} be the function such that Iφ(k) is the kth
1-block in I1, . . . , I2μ. We do the same with c
′ and e′, resulting in blocks I ′1, . . . , I
′
2μ
and function φ′. For any j, we define cl(I ′j) to be the smallest “interval” in {1, . . . , 4μ	}
that contains I ′j .
For 1-blocks Ij and I
′
j′ , we say that Ij overlaps with I
′
j′ if |Ij ∩ cl(I ′j′)| ≥ 3	/4.
We make the following case distinction.
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Case 1: Iφ(k′) does not overlap with I
′
φ′(k′) for some k
′. If all the indices in Iφ(k′)\
cl(I ′φ′(k′)) are larger than those in cl(I
′
φ′(k′)), then e
′
i = 1 for all i ∈ I ′φ′(1)∪· · ·∪I ′φ′(k′),
but ei < 1 for at least 	/4 of these i’s. A similar argument can be used when all
these indices are smaller than those in cl(I ′φ′(k′)). If neither of the above holds, then
e′i = 1 for all i ∈ I ′φ′(k′), but ei < 1 for at least 	/4 of these i’s. Hence, property (a)
of Definition 7.2 is satisfied (with parameter 	/4).
Case 2: Iφ(k) overlaps with I
′
φ′(k) for every k. Since c and c
′ are distinct, and by
the structure of the code, there must exist two subsequent 1-blocks Iφ(k) and Iφ(k+1)
such that the number of 0-blocks between Iφ(k) and Iφ(k+1) is strictly smaller than
the number of 0-blocks between the corresponding 1-blocks I ′φ′(k) and I
′
φ′(k+1). If
there is no 0-block between Iφ(k) and Iφ(k+1) and (at least) one 0-block between I
′
φ′(k)
and I ′φ′(k+1), then by the assumption on the overlap, at least half of the indices i in
the 0-block I ′φ′(k)+1 satisfy ei = ‡. If there is one 0-block between Iφ(k) and Iφ(k+1)
and two 0-blocks between I ′φ′(k) and I
′
φ′(k+1), then at least a quarter of the indices
i ∈ I ′φ′(k)+1∪ I ′φ′(k)+2 satisfy ei = ‡. In both (sub)cases, property (b) of Definition 7.2
is satisfied (with λ = 	/4).
Plugging in the concrete secure position-verification scheme from section 6.3, we
obtain a secure realization of a position-based authentication scheme in Rd, in the
No-PE model.
7.3. Position-based key exchange. The goal of a position-based key exchange
scheme is to have the verifiers agree with honest prover P at location pos on a key
K ∈ {0, 1}L in such a way that no dishonest prover has any (nonnegligible amount
of) information on K beyond its bit-length L, as long as she is not located at pos.8
Formally, we require the following security properties.
εc-completeness. If P is honest and at the claimed position pos, and if there is no
(coalition of) dishonest prover(s), then P and V0, . . . , Vk output the same key
K of positive length, except with probability εc.
εs-security. For any position pos ∈ Hull(pos0, . . . , posk) and for any coalition Pˆ of
dishonest provers at locations all different to pos, the hybrid state ρKE , con-
sisting of the keyK output by the verifiers and the collective quantum system
of Pˆ at the end of the scheme, satisfies δ(ρKE , ρK˜ ⊗ ρE) ≤ εs, where K˜ is
chosen independently and at random of the same bit-length as K.
Note that the security properties only ensure that the verifiers can be convinced
that Pˆ has no information on the key they obtain; no such security is guaranteed for P .
Indeed, Pˆ can always honestly execute the scheme with P , acting as verifiers. Also
note that the security properties do not provide any guarantee to the verifiers that P
has obtained the same key that was output by the verifiers, in case of an active attack
by Pˆ , but this feature can always be achieved, e.g., with the help of a position-based
authentication scheme by having P send an authenticated hash of his key.
A position-based key exchange scheme can easily be obtained by taking any quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) scheme that requires authenticated communication, and
do the authentication by means of a position-based authentication scheme, like the
scheme from the previous section. One subtlety to take care of is that QKD schemes
usually require two-way authentication, whereas position-based authentication only
provides authentication from the prover to the verifiers. However, this problem can
8The length L of the key may depend on the course of the scheme. In particular, an adversary
may enforce it to be 0.
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easily be resolved as follows. Whenever the QKD scheme instructs V0 (acting as Alice
in the QKD scheme) to send a message m in an authenticated way to P (acting as
Bob), V0 sends m without authentication to P , but in the next step P authenticates
the message m′ he has received (supposedly m′ = m) toward the verifiers, who abort
and output an empty key K in case the authentication fails.
Using standard BB84 QKD, we obtain a concrete position-based key exchange
scheme. The security of that scheme follows from the security of the BB84 protocol
[35, 44, 38, 4, 41, 8] and of the position-based authentication scheme.
8. Conclusion, discussion, and open questions. Continuing a very recent
line of research [36, 37, 15, 34, 28, 31], we have given a general proof that information-
theoretic position-verification quantum schemes are impossible, thereby answering an
open question about the security of schemes proposed by [31] to the negative. On the
positive side, we have provided schemes secure under the assumption that dishonest
provers do not use preshared entanglement.
Regarding our positive results, we now briefly discuss some of our assumptions
and their impact when trying to relax them.
• Noise-free quantum information processing: Manipulating quantum states
is an extremely challenging task and far from noise-free with current technol-
ogy. To this end, we would like to point out that for all our positive results,
the honest parties do not need to perform sophisticated quantum computa-
tions; communicating and measuring-upon-arrival BB84 qubits is sufficient.
Furthermore, it is not too hard to see that our schemes can be made robust
against a certain amount of noise. Working out the details is tedious but in
the end straightforward. A related issue is that of losses in the communica-
tion of quantum states: if there are too many slots where no qubit arrives
(because it got lost or because none was emitted), our scheme cannot work.
A natural approach to dealing with a too large number of losses is to consider
schemes with more than two bases.
• Fixed communication velocity, and instantaneous local computations: Re-
laxing the assumption on the fixed communication velocity by allowing the
dishonest parties to communicate (slightly) faster, and/or taking into account
some (small amount of) time for P ’s local computations, has the effect that
P ’s position cannot be verified exactly but only up to some radius. Again,
working out the details is beyond the scope of this work.
• Flat space(time): We do not consider curved spaces, like the surface of a
sphere, or curved spacetime in the presence of matter (or energy). In these
cases, the (im)possibility of position-based cryptography is likely to depend
on the geometry of the space(time).
Our results naturally lead to the following question: How much entanglement is
needed in order to break position-verification protocols? Can we show security in the
bounded-quantum-storage model [21] where adversaries are limited to store, say, a
linear fraction of the communicated qubits, thus restricting the amount of available
entanglement? These questions do remain open in general but have already triggered
quite a bit of follow-up work [3, 11, 46] providing partial answers (see section 1.3 for
details).
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 2.1. In this section we prove the following
lemma (Lemma 2.1): For any tri-partite state ρABY with classical Y ,
H(A|BY ) =
∑
y
PY (y)H(ρ
y
AB |B).
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Proof. We first consider the case of an “empty” B. Y being classical means
that ρAY is of the form ρAY =
∑
y PY (y)ρ
y
A ⊗ |y〉〈y|. Let us write λy1 , . . . , λyn for the
eigenvalues of ρyA. Note that the eigenvalues of ρAY are given by PY (y)λ
y
i with y ∈ Y
and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. It follows that
H(ρAY |Y ) = H(ρAY )−H(ρY )
= −tr(ρAY log(ρAY ))+ tr(ρY log(ρY ))
= −
(∑
y,i
PY (y)λ
y
i log
(
PY (y)λ
y
i
)−∑
y
PY (y) log
(
PY (y)
))
= −
∑
y
PY (y)
∑
i
λyi log
(
λyi
)
=
∑
y
PY (y)H(ρ
y
A) .
In general, we can conclude that
H(ρABY |BY ) = H(ρABY )−H(ρBY )
=
∑
y
PY (y)H(ρ
y
AB)−
∑
y
PY (y)H(ρ
y
B)
=
∑
y
PY (y)
(
H(ρyAB)−H(ρyB)
)
=
∑
y
PY (y)H(ρ
y
AB|B) ,
which proves the claim.
Appendix B. Instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation with N
parties. We generalize the above result to any N -party distributed computation by
generalizing Theorem 4.3 to the case of N parties. We assume that some distinguished
user holds the system A and the information x ∈ X , while for the rest, each user
p = 1 . . .N − 1 holds the system Bp and the classical input yp ∈ Yp. Let us call
the user who holds HA Alice, and the rest of the users Up with p = 1 . . .N − 1.
Denote Hall  HA⊗HB1⊗· · ·⊗HBN−1. The parties share an arbitrary and unknown
state |ψ〉 ∈ Hall ⊗HE and a unitary operation U defined on Hall. The unitary U is
determined by x and {yp} out of some fixed family of unitaries.
Theorem B.1. For every family
{
Ux,y1,...,yN−1
}
of unitaries defined on Hall and
for every ε > 0, given sufficiently many pairwise shared EPR pairs, there exist families
{Ax}, {B1y1}, . . . , {BN−1yN−1} of local operations, acting on Alice’s and Up’s respective
sides, with the following property. For any initial state |ψ〉 ∈ Hall⊗HE and for every
x ∈ X and y1, . . . , yN−1 ∈ Y1×· · ·×YN−1, the joint execution Ax⊗B1y1⊗· · ·⊗BN−1yN−1
transforms the state |ψ〉 into |ϕ′〉 and provides classical outputs k to Alice and 	p
to Up, such that the following holds except with probability ε. The state |ϕ′〉 coincides
with |ϕ〉 = (Ux,y1,...,yN−1⊗IE)|ψ〉 up to local qubitwise operations on systems A and Bp
for p = 1 . . .N − 1 that are determined by k and {	p}.
Proof. As in the two-party case, we may assume that Alice holds |ψ〉 and that
for each player Up, dimHBp = 1. We prove the theorem by induction on the number
of parties. As we have already proven the above for N = 2 (and the case of N = 1
is trivial), let us assume that the proposition holds for N = c and show that it also
holds for N = c+ 1.
1. Alice begins by teleporting∗ the state |ψ〉 to U1 through teleportation channel
number x she shares with U1. Let k◦ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n be the outcome of her
measurement performed during the teleportation∗.
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2. For every i = 1 . . . |X |, denote with |ϕi〉 the state at U1’s end of the ith
teleportation channel. Next, for i = 1, . . . , |X |, users U1 to Uc perform the
scheme given by the induction assumption9 on the input state |ϕi〉 with re-
spective classical information ((i, y1), y2, y3, . . . , yc), and with {U iy1,...,yc :=
Ux=i,y1,...,yc} being the family of unitaries. At the end of the induction step
U1 holds the state |ϕ′i〉 and each of Up obtains a classical output 	ip,10 such
that for every i the state |ϕ′i〉 coincides with (Ux=i,y1,...,yN−1 ⊗ IE)|ϕi〉 up to
local qubitwise operations determined by {	ip}.
3. For every i, U1 teleports∗ |ϕ′i〉 back to Alice, using teleportation channel
number |X |+ i. Let 	◦,i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n be the outcome of his measurement
performed during the teleportation∗.
4. Alice specifies the state at her end of teleportation channel number |X | + x
to be the state |ϕ′〉.
Clearly, if k◦ = 0 · · · 0, then the parties U1, . . . ,Uc on teleportation channel i = x
perform instantaneous quantum computation of the unitary (Ux,y1,...,yc ⊗ IE) on the
state |ψ〉, obtaining the state |ϕ′x〉 which coincides with (Ux,y1,...,yc ⊗ IE)|ψ〉 up to
some local qubitwise operations determined by their classical outputs 	x1 , . . . , 	
x
c , that
is, |ϕ′x〉 = (Wx1 ,...,xcUx,y1,...,yc ⊗ IE)|ψ〉, where W is a tensor product of Pauli matrices
determined by their classical input. The state |ϕ′〉 obtained by Alice at the |X | + x
teleportation channel coincides with |ϕ′x〉 up to local qubitwise operations determined
by 	◦,x, which proves the theorem for this case.
On the other hand, assume k◦ = 0 · · · 0; then by the induction assumption
|ϕ′〉 = (V◦,xWx1 ,...,xcUx,y1,...,ycVk◦ ⊗ IE)|ψ〉
= (V◦,xWx1 ,...,xcUx,y1,...,ycVk◦U
†
x,y1,...,yc ⊗ IE)|ϕ〉,
where V◦,x and Vk◦ are tensor products of Pauli matrices, and Wx1 ,...,xc is the local
qubitwise (Pauli) operations asserted by the induction assumption. Thus, setting
|ψ′〉 := |ϕ′〉, x′ := (x, k◦), y′1 := (y1, 	◦, 	x1), and y′p := (yp, 	xp) for p = 2 . . . c, and
letting
U ′x′,y′1,...,y′c := Ux,y1,...,ycVk◦U
†
x,y1,...,ycWx1 ,...,xcV◦,x ,
the state |ϕ〉 can be written as |ϕ〉 = (U ′x′,y′1,...,y′c ⊗ IE)|ψ
′〉. Again, we are back to the
original problem of applying a unitary, U ′x′,y′1,...,y′c , to a state, |ψ
′〉, held by Alice, where
the unitary depends on classical information x′ and {y′p}, known by Alice and the
users Up, respectively. We complete the proof by recalling that the success probability
per round is a constant which depends only on dimHall. Assuming a sufficient number
of pairwise shared EPR pairs, reapplying the above procedure sufficiently many times
to the resulting new problem instances guarantees that, except with arbitrarily small
probability, the state |ϕ′〉 will be of the required form at some point.
Acknowledgments. We thank Charles Bennett, Fre´de´ric Dupuis, and Louis Sal-
vail for interesting discussions. H.B. would like to thank Sandu Popescu for explaining
Vaidman’s scheme and pointing [19] out to him.
9To be more precise, the scheme is performed with the given instance U, reduced to the case of
c classical inputs, by “merging” the first two inputs, i.e., {Uz1,z2,...,zc}z1∈(X×Y1),z2∈Y2,...,zc∈Yc .
10To simplify notation, we denote by i1 the classical information k
i that U1 obtains when acting
as the distinguished user in the scheme given by the induction assumption.
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